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When a foreign state approaches U.S. officials and asks for the extradi-
tion to its territory of a person it suspects of violating its laws, the Secre-
tary of State makes the final decision whether to surrender the person.'
Initially, however, a federal magistrate rules on whether the person is
extraditable.2 Only if the magistrate so rules does the matter proceed to
the Secretary of State for review.
3
On occasion, in the proceedings before the magistrate, the person
whose surrender is sought asserts that the authorities of the requesting
state will torture him, or subject him to some other violation of basic
human rights. The response of the magistrate is likely to be that the po-
tential ill-treatment is irrelevant to a finding of extraditability. The fed-
eral courts follow the "rule of non-inquiry," which provides that the
magistrate does not inquire into the claim of anticipated ill-treatment.4
Rather, this issue of inquiry is left to the Secretary of State, who may
consider potential ill-treatment in deciding whether to surrender the
person.
In the 1990s, the United States ratified two human rights treaties that
require states to refuse to extradite if ill-treatment is anticipated.5 These
two treaties arguably require the courts to address the issue of human
rights violations instead of leaving such inquiry to the Secretary of State.
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B., 1966, Harvard Law School; M.A.
1966, Harvard University. The author is grateful to Prof. Jordan Paust for consultation on
issues involved in this Article.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1994).
2. Id. § 3184 (1994).
3. Id.
4. See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901) (declaring an act constitutional though it
does not secure rights to an accused in a foreign land); Koskotas v. Roche, 931 F.2d 169
(1st Cir. 1991) (reasoning that the rule of non-inquiry precluded the court from inquiring
into the motives of foreign government); Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990)
(holding that the courts will consider only whether the alleged offender's crimes fall within
the extradition treaty).
5. See infra notes 28, 35-36 (referring to treaties ratified by the United States).
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This Article reviews the case law on the rule of non-inquiry and analyzes
the two human rights treaties to determine whether they require the fed-
eral courts to abandon the rule.
II. THE FEDERAL COURTS' RULE OF NON-INQUIRY
Scenario: A federal magistrate is presented with a request to extradite
Second Story Man (SSM) to Ruritania on a burglary charge. SSM is be-
ing held in a federal detention facility. A bilateral extradition treaty be-
tween the United States and Ruritania requires the United States to
extradite for burglary if Ruritania can demonstrate probable cause that
the person committed the offense. The U.S. attorney has presented evi-
dence on Ruritania's behalf to the magistrate sufficient to establish prob-
able cause. SSM's lawyer proffers evidence showing that if extradited,
SSM is likely to be tortured by police interrogators in Ruritania. The
proffered evidence consists of (1) human rights organizations' reports
that the Ruritania police customarily brutalize suspects; (2) press reports
regarding discrimination in Ruritania against members of an ethnic mi-
nority to which SSM belongs (discrimination that is reflected frequently
in police brutality); and (3) a Ruritanian lawyer prepared to testify on
points one and two as a result of her practice experience.
The U.S. Attorney objects to the introduction of this evidence, arguing
that if torture is a risk, the Secretary of State will have the option to
refuse to extradite. The U.S. Attorney cites federal court precedents in-
structing magistrates to ignore potential rights violations in the requesting
state.
The lawyer, in reply, is unable to refer to a case in which a federal court
refused to find extraditability because of potential ill-treatment, but does
cite cases where federal courts expressed concern about potential mis-
treatment, but refuted the person's claim that mistreatment awaits him.
The lawyer also cites two human rights treaties that, he argues, forbid
extradition if there is a risk of abuse. He notes that the existing federal
case law does not consider these treaties because the United States only
recently became a party to these treaties. The lawyer argues that the pro-
tection the Secretary of State affords is insufficient because the Secretary
may be reluctant to affront Ruritania, which is a political ally currently
assisting the United States in a peace-keeping operation. Only if the mat-
ter is considered in a judicial forum, he argues, can the risk be assessed
objectively. Moreover, he says there is no established procedure whereby
a person being extradited may present to the Secretary of State evidence
regarding the risk of mistreatment. Thus, the person has no means of
[Vol. 45:12131214
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ensuring that the Secretary of State will understand the seriousness of the
risk of mistreatment.
This scenario reflects the context in which the application of the rule of
non-inquiry arises. The basis for the foreign state's request typically
would be a bilateral extradition treaty. In U.S. practice, a foreign state
has a right to extradition only if an extradition treaty is in force that re-
quires the surrender.6 Under federal court procedure, a district court
magistrate hears evidence presented by the U.S. Attorney on behalf of
the requesting state and makes a finding whether the person is extradita-
ble.7 In reaching its decision, the magistrate decides whether the extradi-
tion treaty covers the crime charged,8 and whether the requesting state
has probable cause to believe that the person committed the offense.9 On
application for a writ of habeas corpus a federal district judge has the
authority to review a magistrate's finding of extraditability. Thereafter,
review may be sought in the court of appeals and in the Supreme Court.' °
If the magistrate makes a finding of extraditability, and if that finding is
not reversed on review, the matter proceeds to the Secretary of State,
who decides whether to extradite."1 Normally the Secretary of State fol-
lows the finding of extraditability and surrenders the person; but the Sec-
retary may refuse to do so, particularly if ill treatment in the requesting
state is anticipated.
If an extraditee' 2 asserts before a magistrate that he will be detained or
tried under procedures that violate basic rights, the magistrate is likely to
ignore such a plea. In Neely v. Henkel, 3 the Supreme Court refused to
consider the procedures awaiting an extraditee that might violate the ex-
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994); see United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407,414-15 (1886)
(explaining that the existence of treaties with other countries resolves the question of
whether the United States should extradite); Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258 (6th Cir.)
(holding that a valid treaty is required for extradition and that an extradition treaty with
Italy was not terminated but merely was suspended during war), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 818
(1957).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994).
8. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287-88 (1933).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994); see Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 311-12 (1922) (deter-
mining whether the charged crime is covered by extradition treaty); Ex parte La Mantia,
206 F. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (holding that enough evidence exists to charge the accused with
murder).
10. Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247 (4th Cir. 1976) (reviewing an extradition order
after an accused filed a writ of habeas corpus), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1994); see Factor, 290 U.S. at 304 (holding that the Secretary of
State has authority to order extradition).
12. The term "extraditee" is used in this Article to mean a person whose extradition is
sought by a foreign state under an extradition treaty.
13. 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
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traditee's basic rights.14 In Neely, the person being extradited to Cuba
argued that if surrendered he would be tried under Cuban procedure,
which provided for no jury trial, no habeas corpus protection, and no
protection against bills of attainder or ex post facto laws. 5 Rejecting this
argument, the Supreme Court said that although the enumerated protec-
tions were not available in Cuban courts, the person could, nonetheless,
be found extraditable. 16 The Court stated that an extraditee is not enti-
tled to "a trial in any other mode than that allowed to its own people by
the country whose laws he has violated and from whose justice he has
fled."' 7
Federal courts follow the approach taken in Neely even if the ex-
traditee refers not to the general mode of trial in the requesting state, but
to facts suggesting that he, in particular, may be treated unfairly. A con-
temporary example is Ahmad v. Wigen. 8 Following a magistrate's find-
ing of extraditability, the extraditee sought habeas corpus relief. The
district judge heard extensive evidence presented by the extraditee that
he might be tortured in the requesting state. 9 The district judge found,
however, that this evidence did not show a likelihood of torture and ruled
the man extraditable."0 The Second Circuit affirmed the finding of ex-
traditability but criticized the district court judge for hearing evidence
about potential torture, explaining that "[a] consideration of the proce-
dures that will or may occur in the requesting country is not within the
purview of a habeas corpus judge."'"
The Second Circuit stated it was left to the Secretary of State's discre-
tion alone to consider potential ill-treatment in the requesting state.22
Citing an earlier decision of its own, the court elaborated that "the degree
of risk to [appellant's] life from extradition is an issue that properly falls
within the exclusive purview of the executive branch. '23 Citing another
earlier decision, the court noted, "it is not the business of our courts to
14. Id. at 122-25 (holding that no right to trial, similar to a trial in the United States,
need exist in a foreign country for extradition to take effect).
15. Id. at 122.
16. Id. at 122-23 (reasoning that although appellant is a United States citizen, he is not
immune from criminal punishment when he commits crimes in other countries).
17. Id. at 123.
18. 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
19. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 416-20 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
20. Id. at 420.
21. Ahmad, 910 F.2d at 1066.
22. Id. at 1067.
23. Id. at 1066 (citing Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980)) (seeking
denial of extradition for fraudulent bankruptcy, claiming he had political enemies in Italy,
and presenting a photograph from a street demonstration in which a participant displayed
a slogan reading "Death to Sindona"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981).
1216 [Vol, 45:1213
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assume the responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judicial sys-
tem of another sovereign nation. 24
The rule of non-inquiry is rationalized on the basis that the Secretary of
State may refuse to surrender, and that the United States may minimize
the risk of rights violations by avoiding extradition treaties with states in
which procedural protections are weak.25 The rule of non-inquiry reflects
the character of extradition as a procedure involving rights and obliga-
tions between states,26 rather than as a procedure designed to protect
individuals.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND EXTRADITION
Although extradition is a matter between the requested state and the
requesting state, the emergence in the mid-twentieth century of human
rights law brought pressure to abandon the rule of non-inquiry. One
commentator on extradition law remarked that "[t]he emergence of the
individual as a recognized participant in the processes of extradition and
the applicability of internationally protected human rights are likely to
curtail if not eliminate the rule of non-inquiry. 
'27
A key international instrument leading in this direction is the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, which provides:
1. No State Party shall ... extradite a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would
be in danger of being subjected to torture.
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such
grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all
relevant considerations including, where applicable, the exist-
ence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, fla-
grant or mass violations of human rights.28
24. Id. (citing Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484-85, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833
(1976)).
25. Koskotas v. Roche, 931 F.2d 169, 173-74 (1st Cir. 1991).
26. The term "state," unless otherwise indicated, is used in this Article to mean "na-
tion state."
27. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC OR-
DER 466 (1974).
28. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, 198, art. 3,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, entered into force June 26, 1987, [hereinafter
Convention Against Torture].
1996] 1217
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The Convention Against Torture came into force for the United States
in 1994.29 The United States Senate, in consenting to its ratification, en-
tered an "understanding" that the extradition of a suspect should be de-
nied only "if it is more likely than not that he would be tortured."3 The
United States entered no other qualification to the applicability of this
provision.
The Convention Against Torture does not specify which branch of gov-
ernment must ensure that extradition is denied if torture is anticipated,
referring to the agency making this determination only as the "competent
authorities."31  When President Reagan submitted the Convention
Against Torture to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification in
1988,32 he included a proposed qualification: "The United States declares
that the phrase, 'competent authorities,' as used in Article 3 of the Con-
vention, refers to the Secretary of State in extradition cases .... ,,33
This statement would have meant that the courts should not consider
the question of anticipated treatment of the extraditee, and thus that the
rule of non-inquiry prevails. However, the Senate did not give its consent
to the Convention Against Torture during President Reagan's term in
office.
Two years later, when President Bush submitted the Convention
Against Torture to the Senate, he omitted any comparable language.31 It
is not clear from the record precisely why this change was made. One
may infer from the omission either that President Bush and/or the Senate
changed their view and opposed the rule of non-inquiry in torture cases,
or that they deemed it better not to deal with the matter with qualifying
language. In any event, the omission leaves the matter without Presiden-
tial or Congressional expression of opinion on the issue.
29. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL STATUS
AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1994 177 (1995) (showing ratification on Oct. 21, 1994, which meant
entry into force on Nov. 20, 1994) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES]. Instrument of
ratification signed (subject to all Senate qualifications) by President Clinton on Sept. 19,
1994 (information supplied to author by Office of Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of
State).
30. 136 CONG. REC. S17,492 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
31. Convention Against Torture, supra note 28.
32. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREAT-
MENT OF PUNISHMENT, ADOPTED By UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON DECEMBER 10, 1984, AND SIGNED By THE UNITED STATES ON
APRIL 18, 1988, S. TREATY Doc. No. 20, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
33. Id. at 7.
34. CONG. REC., supra note 30.
1218 [Vol. 45:1213
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Another human rights treaty relevant to the rule of non-inquiry is the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,35 which obliges
states to guarantee an extensive array of rights in criminal proceedings.36
The United States became a party to the International Covenant in
1992.1' Although the International Covenant contains no express provi-
sion on extradition, it has been construed to require a state to refrain
from extraditing a person to a state that would violate any covenant-pro-
tected right.38 The Human Rights Committee (Committee), a body of
legal experts established under the International Covenant to hear allega-
tions of state party violations, has construed the provision in this man-
ner.39 The Committee exercises the function of interpreting the
International Covenant.4 °
35. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter International Covenant].
36. See, e.g., id. art. 7 (highlighting torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment), art. 9 (enforcing right to prompt appearance before a judge and right of
habeas corpus), art. 10 (sustaining right to humane conditions of incarceration), art. 14
(requiring right to be presumed innocent; right to be informed of a charge; opportunity to
prepare a defense; speedy trial; right to counsel; right to cross-examine witnesses; privilege
against self-incrimination; right if convicted to an appeal; double jeopardy protection), art.
15 (prohibiting ex post facto laws).
37. White House Statement on Signing the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1008 (June 5, 1992) (President Bush stating, in part,
"I ... ratify and confirm the said Covenant, subject to the said reservations, understandings
and declarations" (typescript, copy on file with author). The United States submitted its
instrument of ratification on June 8, 1992, and under the Covenant, it enters into force
three months after this submission. See International Covenant, supra note 35, art. 49.
Thus, the Covenant entered into force for the United States on September 8, 1992.
38. See infra notes 41-64 and accompanying text (providing examples of how the Inter-
national Covenant has been construed). See also International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force Jan. 4,
1969, which lacks a provision on extradition where discrimination in the requesting state is
anticipated. Like the International Covenant, the Convention is implemented by a com-
mittee that has never considered the inquiry issue. By the same logic used by the Human
Rights Committee, however, the implementing committee could well construe the Conven-
tion to require inquiry. If that were done, the Convention would confront U.S. courts with
the issues analyzed in this article regarding the Convention Against Torture and the Inter-
national Covenant. The United States became a party to the "International Convention
On The Elimination Of All Forms Of Racial Discrimination" in 1994. See MULTILATERAL
TREATIES, supra note 29, at 92 (indicating U.S. ratification on Oct. 21, 1994, which meant
entry into force on Nov. 20, 1994).
39. International Covenant, supra note 35, art. 28 (describing that the committee is to
be composed of 18 elected members who are to be nationals of the state parties to the
covenant).
40. General Comment Adopted by the Human Rights Committee under Article 40, Par-
agraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Addendum; General
comment on issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Cove-
nant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the
Catholic University Law Review
The Committee considered this issue in three cases in 1993-94, all in-
volving Canada's extradition of persons facing the possibility of execution
in the United States. In the first case, decided in 1993, Joseph Kindler
had been convicted of murder in Pennsylvania. 41 After the jury recom-
mended the death penalty, but before the court imposed the sentence,
Kindler escaped and fled to Canada.42 While extradition proceedings
were pending for his surrender to U.S. authorities, he filed a complaint
with the Human Rights Committee, asking the Committee to inform
Canada that his extradition to Pennsylvania to face execution would vio-
late the Covenant.43 Kindler argued that the death penalty constituted
cruel or inhuman treatment as the Covenant prohibited, 44 and alterna-
tively, that the long-term close confinement of persons sentenced to
death in Pennsylvania was cruel and inhuman.45
Canada objected, arguing that it should be responsible under the Cove-
nant only for violations occurring within Canada, but not for violations
committed in the United States.46 The Covenant does not expressly pro-
vide that a state party must refrain from facilitating another state's viola-
tions, or that it must deny extradition if the requesting state might violate
Covenant-protected rights.47 The Covenant contains only a general obli-
gation to comply with the Covenant: "Each State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant .... ,48
Rejecting Canada's reasoning, the Committee read this provision as re-
quiring a state, requested by another to extradite a person, to consider
Covenant, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., 1382d mtg. General Comment No. 24 at 9 11,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6 (1994), reprinted in 34 LL.M. 840, 843 (1995) (defining
the Committee's role as that of "interpreting the provisions of the Covenant and the devel-
opment of a jurisprudence [case law]") [hereinafter General Comment].
41. Kindler v. Canada, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Communications No. 470/1991, dec. of
July 30, 1993, reprinted in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 307, 308 (1993).
42. Id.
43. Id.; see Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, to which Canada is a party and whereby a state
party to the International Covenant may consent to having the Human Rights Committee
hear complaints by individuals who allege that the state has violated their rights under the
International Covenant.
44. Kindler, 14 Hum. Rts. L.J. at 308; International Covenant, supra note 35, art. 7
(prohibiting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment).
45. Kindler, 14 Hum. Rts. L.J. at 308. While the case was pending before the Commit-
tee, Canada extradited Kindler to Pennsylvania. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. International Covenant, supra note 35, art. 2; Kindler, 14 Hum. Rts. L.J. at 308.
1220 [Vol. 45:1213
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potential violations by the requesting state, even if the requesting state is
not a party to the International Covenant. The Committee said:
[I]f a State party takes a decision relating to a person within its
jurisdiction, and the necessary and foreseeable consequence is
that that person's rights under the Covenant will be violated in
another jurisdiction, the State party itself may be in violation of
the Covenant .... For example, a State party would itself be in
violation of the Covenant if it handed over a person to another
State in circumstances in which it was foreseeable that torture
would take place.49
Later in its decision, the Committee restated this point in slightly differ-
ent terms: "If a State party extradites a person within its jurisdiction in
circumstances such that as a result there is a real risk that his or her rights
under the Covenant will be violated in another jurisdiction, the State
party itself may be in violation of the Covenant." 50
Although the Committee ruled that Canada must consider whether the
requesting state might violate Covenant-protected rights, it disagreed
with Kindler's contention that his Covenant-protected rights would be vi-
olated in Pennsylvania.5
The Human Rights Committee reiterated the views expressed in Kin-
dler in another 1993 case. The United States alleged Charles Chitat Ng
committed multiple murders in California, but he had not been arrested
there.52 Ng was in Canada, and the United States sought his extradi-
tion.53 Like Kindler, Ng complained to the Human Rights Committee,54
arguing that in California he would be tried for a capital offense and that
capital punishment, in general, violated the Covenant.55 He suggested
alternatively that execution in California's gas chamber was cruel and in-
human and adduced extensive evidence about prior executions in that gas
49. Kindler, 14 Hum. Rts. L.J. at 309.
50. Id. at 313.
51. Id. at 313-14 (stating that the death penalty is not prohibited by the Covenant and
that Kindler had not submitted evidence to show how Pennsylvania treated death row
inmates, nor evidence about his psychological make-up and how he might be affected by
death row confinement).
52. Ng v. Canada, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Communications No. 469/1991, Dec. of
Nov. 5, 1993, reprinted in 15 HUM. Rrs. L.J. 149 (1994).
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chamber.56 Canada extradited Ng to California without awaiting the
Committee's decision.
5 7
On the merits of Ng's argument, Canada objected as it had in Kindler,
explaining that it should not be responsible for actions the United States
might take regarding Ng.58 The Committee disagreed, repeating its lan-
guage from Kindler regarding a "real risk" of a rights violation following
extradition.59 It then found that the gas chamber, as used in California,
inflicted unnecessary suffering constituting cruel and inhuman treat-
ment.6° On this basis, the Committee found that Canada violated the
Covenant by extraditing Ng to California.61 The Committee asked Can-
ada "to make such representations as might still be possible to avoid the
imposition of the death penalty and appeals to the State party [Canada]
to ensure that a similar situation does not arise in the future. 62
The third case, decided in 1994, involved Keith Cox. The United States
sought Cox for extradition from Canada to Pennsylvania on a charge of
capital murder.63 The Committee did not revisit its views concerning the
obligations of a requested state. Writing on the assumption that the re-
quested state must consider a risk of the requesting state's possible rights
violations, the Committee found that Canada would commit no violation
of the Covenant through extradition of Cox to the United States.64
Thus, the International Covenant, like the Convention Against Tor-
ture, forbids extradition if rights violations are anticipated.65 The Inter-
national Covenant applies across a broader range of potential violations
by requesting states than does the Convention Against Torture because
56. Id. at 154; see International Covenant, supra note 35, art. 7 (prohibiting cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment).
57. Ng v. Canada, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Communications No. 469/1991, dec. of
Nov. 5, 1993, reprinted in 15 Hum. Rts. L.J. 162 (1994).
58. Id. at 152.
59. Id. at 156 ("[1]f a State party extradites a person within its jurisdiction in such
circumstances that as a result there is a real risk that his or her rights under the Covenant
will be violated in another jurisdiction, the State party itself may be in violation of the
Covenant.").
60. Id. at 157.
61. Id.
62. Id. According to the Optional Protocol, supra note 43, art. 1, states adhering to
the Optional Protocol authorize the Committee to "receive and consider communica-
tions," but the provision does not expressly provide that states must abide by the Commit-
tee's decision.
63. Cox v. Canada, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Communications No. 539/1993, Dec. of
Oct. 31, 1994, reprinted in 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 410 (1994).
64. Id. at 416-17.
65. This Article will not analyze in detail the issue of the degree of likelihood of such a
violation before the duty to refuse surrender arises.
1222 [Vol. 45:1213
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the coverage of rights in the International Covenant is more extensive.66
However, both treaties require that the United States refrain from extra-
diting to a state where rights violations are anticipated.67
IV. INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE ON INQUIRY Vs. NON-INQUIRY
Neither the Convention Against Torture, nor the Human Rights Com-
mittee in its construction of the International Covenant, indicates
whether courts must inquire into potential ill-treatment in the requesting
state, or whether the courts may leave such inquiry to the executive
branch, as is the practice in the United States where the matter is left to
the Secretary of State. There is, however, considerable international gui-
dance suggesting that such inquiry is a function incumbent upon the
courts.
The International Covenant contains a provision requiring that courts
of a state party apply the International Covenant. 68 A state party must
ensure the observance of Convention-protected rights by all relevant in-
stitutions, including courts.69 It is obliged "[t]o ensure that any person
whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an
66. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text (discussing the Convention Against
Torture and the International Covenant).
67. Two regional human rights treaties to which the United States is not a party simi-
larly forbid extradition where ill-treatment is anticipated. The first, the Inter-American
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, art. 13, 25 I.L.M. 519, 524 states
that:
Extradition shall not be granted nor shall the person sought be returned when
there are grounds to believe that his life is in danger, that he will be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or that he will be tried by
special or ad hoc courts in the requesting State.
The second agreement on this subject is the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 224 as construed
by the European Court of Human Rights in Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep.
439 (1989) (explaining that extradition is prohibited if there is a real risk of exposure to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), and by the European Commission of
Human Rights in X v. Germany, 1963 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON H.R. 462, 480 (precluding
extradition if treatment can be anticipated), and in X. v. Austria & Yugoslavia, 1964 Y.B.
EUR. CONY. ON H.R. 314, 328 (raising an extradition issue under the Convention's article
prohibiting torture or cruel treatment if it appears that the rights of extraditee may be
violated in the requesting state). See also Amekrane v. U.K., 1973 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON
H.R. 356, 376 (questioning extradition where torture or other ill-treatment is anticipated);
X. v. Switzerland, 24 Eur. Comm'n of H.R. Dec. & Rep. 205, 219 (1980) (extradition might
raise issue under art. 3 if rights of extraditee would be violated in requesting state); Altun
v. Federal Republic of Germany, 36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 209, 231-35 (1984)
(finding that extradition may be denied even where the individual was suspected of inter-
fering with criminal proceedings against the murderers of a political figure and where tor-
ture might be used to extract information from him).
68. International Covenant, supra note 35, art. 2.
69. Id.
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effective remedy."7 Further, and importantly, a state party is obliged
"[tjo ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal
system of the State.,
71
Thus, while the International Covenant contemplates that administra-
tive authorities, such as the Secretary of State, will play a role in rights
enforcement, it expects all state agencies, courts included, to be used. All
branches of government must apply the International Covenant if it is
relevant to decisions they make.
72
If there is any doubt that the International Covenant requires domestic
courts to apply the rights analysis, instruction can be gained from the
manner in which the courts of state parties have implemented the provi-
sions.73  A strong indication of state practice is that, apart from the
United States, no state party to the International Covenant has entered a
qualifying statement reducing the level of applicability of the Interna-
tional Covenant's provisions in its courts.74
Another indication that judicial enforcement is contemplated is that
the Human Rights Committee, as part of its monitoring of how states
70. Id. art. 2(3)(a).
71. Id. art. 2(3)(b). The wording of this subsection is grammatically open to the con-
struction that the state has a choice as to which of the three branches will enforce the
Covenant. However, this subsection, as it reads in the French and Spanish texts of the
Covenant, is open to no such construction. Those texts, as translated into English by this
author, read: "ensure that the competent judicial, administrative, or legislative authority or
any other authority competent under the legislation of the state shall rule on the rights of a
person who makes the claim." This formulation makes it clear that any branch of govern-
ment that deals with a matter involving a Covenant-based right must apply the Covenant.
When one official text of a treaty is ambiguous, but another is precise, the one that is
precise must be followed because the applicable rule of construction is to read the text in
the different languages in such a manner that they make sense in all the languages. Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 33, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969)
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). The five official texts of the International Covenant, all
equally authentic, are written in Chinese, Russian, English, Spanish, and French. See In-
ternational Covenant, supra note 35, art. 53.
72. See William M. Walker, Note, The Remedies of Law of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights: Current Trends and a Conceptual Framework for the Future,
20 N. Y. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 525, 530-37 (1988) (discussing domestic application of the Cove-
nant); id. at 540-42 (reviewing reports of the Human Rights Committee requesting that
states must provide compensation and injunctive relief as appropriate to remedy
violations).
73. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 71, art. 31, 13(b) (indicating
that the manner in which states have applied the treaty is a guide to the interpretation of a
treaty provision); see LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 424-29 (1961) (showing that
"practical construction" of a treaty provision by a state is evidence of what it is intended to
mean).
74. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 29, at 118-30.
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comply with the Covenant, 75 asks states whether their courts apply the
International Covenant.76 This pattern of questioning shows that the
Committee views domestic judicial enforcement as a requirement of the
International Covenant. State parties usually reply that their courts apply
the International Covenant.77
Further, the Human Rights Committee has stressed the importance of
domestic judicial enforcement as an obligation assumed by state parties.78
The Committee stressed that it would be incompatible with the object
and purpose of the International Covenant for a state party to "reserve
an entitlement not to take the necessary steps at the domestic level to
give effect to the rights of the Covenant (Article 2(2)),",79 and further, "a
State could not make a reservation to article 2, paragraph 3 of the Cove-
nant, indicating that it intends to provide no remedies for human rights
violations."8"
In the specific instance of extradition where ill-treatment is a risk, the
practice of domestic courts is in the same direction. Courts often deem it
their obligation to deal with potential ill-treatment in a requesting state,
75. International Covenant, supra note 35, art. 40 (requiring periodic reports to the
Committee by state parties).
76. See, e.g., Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp.
No. 40 at 12 (153), U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (1989) (addressing question to Norway); id. at 21
( 98) (addressing question to Mexico); id. at 44 (9192) (addressing question to the Nether-
lands); id. at 120-21 ( 546) (addressing question to Italy).
77. Cindy A. Cohn, The Early Harvest: Domestic Legal Changes Related to the
Human Rights Committee and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 13 HUM. RTs. Q.
295, 316-20 (1991). See, e.g., Report of the Human Rights Committee, supra note 76, at 44
(1194) (reply of the Netherlands that 58 judgments in Dutch courts mentioned Covenant
articles, that Covenant rights are enforceable in Dutch courts, and that "[alny legislative
act contrary to a provision of the Covenant would become inapplicable"); id. at 121 ( 549)
(reply of Italy that treaties become domestic law without specific adoption, that parliament
had nonetheless enacted a law stating that the Covenant would be domestic law, and that
the courts frequently cite the Covenant); Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N.
GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 40 at 83 ( 368), U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988) (reply of France
that 20 decisions of French courts rely on the Covenant); id. at 137-38 ( 588) (reply of
Japan that under its constitution, treaty provisions prevail over domestic legislation before
Japanese courts, and that this rule applies to the Covenant).
78. General Comment, supra note 40, at 843 ("The intention of the Covenant is that
the rights contained therein should be ensured to all those under a State party's
jurisdiction.")
79. Id. at 842.
80. Id. at 843.
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rather than leave the matter to the executive branch.8 1 If ill-treatment is
anticipated, it is the duty of the court to block extradition. 82
The widespread nature of this practice is reflected in an extradition
provision in the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances,83 a treaty not relating to human rights, and to
which the United States is a party.' According to the Convention, a
state party must, at the request of another state party, extradite a person
charged with illicit drug violations.85 However, the requested state "may
refuse to comply with such requests where there are substantial grounds
leading its judicial or other competent authorities to believe that compli-
ance would facilitate the prosecution or punishment of any person on
account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions., 86 This pro-
vision presumes that courts will typically be the agency determining
whether an extraditee faces discrimination in the requesting state.
The practice of foreign courts supports this interpretation. In Ger-
many, for example, courts refuse to find extraditability if they anticipate
inhuman or degrading treatment in the requesting state.87 Swedish prac-
tice is the same, as demonstrated by its Supreme Court refusing to extra-
dite a Soviet teenager who hijacked a Soviet airplane.88 While in custody
in Sweden, the youth attempted suicide.89 The court heard psychiatric
testimony that the youth would "go under" mentally if sent to a Soviet
penal facility.9 ° Based both on his mental condition and on the court's
81. See e.g. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 412 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (explaining that
even though the executive branch conducts foreign policy, the court must exercise its in-
dependent judgment in an extradition case); see also infra notes 182-234 and accompanying
text (describing precedent for ignoring the rule of non-inquiry).
82. Ahmed, 726 F. Supp. at 412 (explaining that courts may not compromise judicial
integrity).
83. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,
Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989).
84. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 29, at 282 (showing ratification on Feb. 20,
1990); see also 135 CONG. REC. 31,383 (1989) (noting ratification subject to three express
understandings).
85. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,
supra note 83, art. 6(2), at 507.
86. Id. art. 6(6) (emphasis added).
87. Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser.A) at 439 (1989) (providing a
statement by the the German government to the European Court of Human Rights).
88. Sweden Won't Deport Soviet Hijacker, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1990, at A29 [herein-
after Sweden Won't Deport]; 18 Year Old Soviet Hijacker Faces Trial in Sweden, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1990, at A25 (case of Mikhail Mokretsov) [hereinafter Soviet Hijacker].
89. Sweden Won't Deport, supra note 88, at A29; Soviet Hijacker, supra note 88, at
A25.
90. Sweden Won't Deport, supra note 88, at A29; Soviet Hijacker, supra note 88, at
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assessment that Soviet penal facilities did not meet international stan-
dards, the court refused to extradite him.91
Argentina's courts refused to extradite a man facing capital punish-
ment in Chile.92 Argentina abolished the death penalty, and its courts
were not prepared to order extradition to a state where the death penalty
would be imposed.93 The Supreme Court of Chile indicated that it would
endeavor to comply with Argentina's wishes.94 A lower Argentine court
stated this was not a sufficient assurance.95 On appeal, the Argentine
Supreme Court held that extradition should be ordered only if the Chil-
ean executive agreed to commute any death sentence that might be im-
posed. 96 Here, the Argentine courts operated on the basis of Argentine
public policy, rather than on the basis of a treaty prohibition against capi-
tal punishment. Nevertheless, the case is relevant for present purposes
because it was the Argentine courts, rather than the executive, that ad-
dressed the issue.
97
French courts also consider their state's own public policy (ordre pub-
lic) and deny extradition if the requesting state would treat the extraditee
in a manner that violates basic fairness as understood in France. The
Conseil d'ttat, which has the power to quash a government extradition
order, blocked a requested extradition to Turkey where capital punish-
ment awaited the extraditee.98 In that case, Turkey sought extradition on
a murder charge. 99 The French government inquired whether Turkey
planned to execute the man, explaining to the Turkish government that
the death penalty violates French ordre public.' The Turkish govern-
ment replied that the death penalty was available under Turkish law only
for premeditated murder, which had not been charged in the instant
case.1" 1 In ordering the extradition, the French government indicated
that it was acting on the understanding that Turkey would not execute the
91. Sweden Won't Deport, supra note 88, at A29; Soviet Hijacker, supra note 88, at
A25.
92. In re Pedro Alejandrine Flores, 5 ANN. DIG. PUB. INT'L. L. CASES 289 (Argentina,
Federal Supreme Court, Feb. 4, 1929).




97. Id. at 290.
98. Judgment of Feb. 27, 1987 (Memik Fidan), Conseil d' ttat, 1987 D.S. Jur. 305 (Fr.).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 306.
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man.1 2 The Conseil d'ttat quashed the extradition order, however, be-
cause France failed to secure Turkey's agreement not to execute.
103
The Supreme Court of Ireland refused to extradite two men who es-
caped from a jail in Northern Ireland and fled to the Republic of Ire-
land."° The United Kingdom sought their extradition, but the court
refused, finding a "probable risk" that they would be beaten if returned
to the Northern Ireland jail.105 The United Kingdom lost on another ex-
tradition request from the Republic of Ireland, when Ireland's Attorney
General refused even to initiate the court proceeding that could lead to a
finding of extraditability106 In that case, the United Kingdom sought the
extraditee for allegedly supplying weapons in Northern Ireland to the
Irish Republican Army. 10 7 The Attorney General of Ireland found that
there had been extensive negative press coverage in the United Kingdom
about the man and about his alleged act.1" 8 On the basis of this publicity,
the Attorney General concluded that "it would not be possible for a jury
[in the United Kingdom] to approach the issue of his guilt or innocence
102. Id.
103. Id. at 310. The government attorney questioned the propriety of extraditing even
if the requesting state agreed not to impose the death penalty, arguing that such an agree-
ment would bind only the executive branch of the Turkish government, but not its judici-
ary. Id. at 308 (discussing the conclusions of Mr. Bonichot, a government attorney); see
also Judgment of July 7, 1978 (Klaus Croissant), Conseil d'8tat, 1978 Lebon 292 (Act. jur.
D.A. 1978.559, chron. Dutheillet de Lamothe et Robineau), reprinted in 106 J. DU DROIT
Irr'L 90, 92 (1979); Case of Lujambio-Galdeano, 1985 J.C.P. II, No. 20346 (Conseil d'ttat,
Sept. 26, 1984) (where Basque separatists argued that they would be tried through unfair
procedures if surrendered to Spain, the Conseil inquired into the anticipated Spanish pro-
cedures and found that "contrary to the allegations of the claimant, the Spanish judicial
system respects the fundamental rights and liberties of the individual, as is required by the
general principles of the law of extradition") (translation by author). French courts are
split on the question of whether French ordre public is violated, and thus whether extradi-
tion is precluded, if the extraditee was already convicted in the requesting state but was
convicted in absentia. See Delmerle, J.C.P. I1., No. 6493 (Douai, Feb. 1, 1951) (noting
Magnol), cited in Case of Memik Fidan, 1987 D.S. Jur. at 306; Case of Manenti, Cour
d'appel de Paris, Jan. 7, 1987, noted in Charles Rousseau, Jurisprudence francaise en ma-
tiere de droit international public, 93 REVUE GP-NI-RALE DE DROIT INT'L PUBLIC 457, 462-
63 (1989) (refusing extradition). But see id. at 463-64 (noting that some French appellate
courts hold to the contrary).
104. Edward Gorman & Robert Oakley, Anger as Irish Judges Free Two Terrorists, THE
TIMES, Mar. 14, 1990, at 12 (noting the dispositions of Dermot Finucane and James Pius
Clarke); Irish High Court Bars Extraditing 2 in I.R.A., N.Y. TIMES INT'L, Mar. 15, 1990, at
A3 [hereinafter Irish High Court].
105. Gorman & Oakley, supra note 104, at 12; Irish High Court, supra note 104, at A3.
106. John Murray, Media and MPs 'made fair trial impossible,' DAILY TELEGRAPH,
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free from bias," and on that basis the Attorney General refused to initiate
extradition proceedings.10 9
The international practice of employing judicial inquiry regarding
human rights violations, given the International Covenant and the Con-
vention Against Torture, suggests that the obligation to refrain from ex-
traditing where ill-treatment is anticipated is read to impose an obligation
on courts to make the inquiry that federal courts in the United States
decline to make.
V. THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AS LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
Relevant international institutions and the courts of other states of the
world read the Convention Against Torture and the International Cove-
nant to require a court inquiry regarding whether an extraditee will be
mistreated. 110 This requirement, however, is binding on U.S. courts only
if the treaties constitute domestic law in the United States.'11 Under the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause, a treaty is the "supreme Law of the
Land.""' 2 This seems to require that courts apply the two treaties as law.
However, when the United States Senate consented to presidential ratifi-
cation of the two treaties, the Senate specified in special declarations that
the treaties should not be deemed "self-executing.""' 3 President George
Bush endorsed the Senate's position when he ratified the International
Covenant," 4 and President Clinton also supported the non-self-executing
language when he ratified the Covenant Against Torture. 1 5 As a result,
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (providing examples where extradi-
tion has been forbidden).
111. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
112. Id. "Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby...." Id.
113. 138 CONG. REC. S4784 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (stating that the provisions of Arti-
cles 1 through 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also are not
self-executing); 136 CONG. REC. S17,492 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (stating that the provi-
sions of Articles 1 through 16 of the Convention Against Torture are not self-executing).
Under the federal code, however, district courts have "original jurisdiction of all civil ac-
tions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1994); Bodemtller v. United States, 39 F. 437, 439 (W.D. La. 1889) (asserting the
district court's jurisdiction over a claim challenging a decision of the French-American
commission, an 1880 treaty establishment). Thus, a private cause of action based on a
treaty may be heard in federal court.
114. White House Statement on Signing the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 28 WEEKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 1008 (June 5, 1992).
115. President Clinton signed the instrument of ratification on Sept. 19, 1994, subject to
all Senate qualifications. (The Office of Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, supplied
information to the author).
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the United States ratification of both treaties was subject to the Senate's
declaration.
If binding on the courts and read broadly, these declarations might
mean that a court must disregard the two treaties when an extraditee
cites them as a bar to a finding of extraditability. However, the Supreme
Court construes the Supremacy Clause as meaning that if a treaty provi-
sion creates a right, the courts should allow a party that appears to be a
beneficiary of that right to assert it.116 The Supreme Court uses the term
"self-executing" for treaty clauses that provide rights upon which an indi-
vidual party may rely in court. 117
When the Senate provided that the two treaties were not to be "self-
executing," it may have intended that the treaties' provisions not be in-
voked before the courts under any circumstances. However, after the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the language that the In-
ternational Covenant should not be deemed "self-executing," the Com-
mittee sent a letter to the full Senate explaining that in keeping the
Covenant as non-self-executing, it intended only to ensure that a private
cause of action not be based on the Covenant. 1 8
The Committee was apparently wary of creating, by treaty, a federal
cause of action over and above those previously authorized by Congress.
Indeed, it is probable that a new cause of action in the federal courts
cannot be created absent an act of Congress, which a treaty is not. In the
extradition context, however, an extraditee has no need for a special
cause of action to invoke the Convention Against Torture or the Interna-
tional Covenant. Rather, the extraditee is brought into court involunta-
rily and invokes the treaty to defeat extradition.
If a court entertaining an extradition request considers one of the two
treaties, it is not allowing a plaintiff to base a cause of action on the
116. See Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341-43 (1924) (holding that a city
ordinance violated the provisions of a treaty aimed at establishing equality between Amer-
ican citizens and Japanese citizens residing in the United States). The Court noted that
"[tjreaties are to be construed in a broad and liberal spirit, and, when two constructions are
possible, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it and the other favorable to
them, the latter is to be preferred." Id. at 342 (citations omitted).
117. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933) (interpreting self-executing as not
requiring legislation in order to authorize an action pursuant to the provisions of a treaty).
118. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVE-
NANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, reprinted in 31 LL.M. 645,657 (1992) ("The intent
is to clarify that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts."); see
also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 818-19 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (noting that the International Covenant implicitly denies a private cause of
action by directing states to enact implementing legislation), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003
(1985). Contra John Quigley, Judge Bork Is Wrong: The Covenant Is The Law, 71 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1087 (1993) (criticizing Judge Bork's view in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic).
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treaty. The extraditee is the object of extradition proceedings rather than
the moving party. This is true even though once a magistrate decides that
the person is extraditable, it is open to the extraditee to file a habeas
corpus action to challenge the ruling. Here the cause of action is one in
habeas corpus. The extraditee needs no additional basis for filing. The
issue is not that of a cause of action, but, rather, that of the substantive
law to be applied. Here, the treaties are relevant because they require a
court's inquiry.
An additional consideration for the courts in deciding whether to de-
cline application of the two treaties, given the Senate declaration, is that
if courts do not apply the treaties, they place the United States in viola-
tion. In the case of the International Covenant, as indicated above, the
treaty text expressly requires that courts comply." 9 If a court construes
the Senate declaration as freeing it of the obligation to apply the Interna-
tional Covenant, the court puts the United States in violation of its obli-
gations under the International Covenant. If a domestic law provision
admits of two constructions, one of which would put the United States in
violation of its international obligations, courts will choose the other con-
struction in order to maintain the integrity of the international
obligation. 2 °
VI. THE COURTS' POWER TO DETERMINE SELF-EXECUTION
Even if one assumes, however, that the Senate intended to preclude
invocation of the two treaties more broadly, it is not clear that the Senate
declaration concerning self-execution binds a federal court. Under estab-
lished precedent, the courts, rather than the Senate, decide whether a
treaty provision is self-executing. 21
Although the Senate declarations were intended to be communicated
to the Secretary-General, and thus to the other state parties, and were in
119. See supra text accompanying notes 68-71 (discussing the courts' obligation to apply
the treaty).
120. See The Over The Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D. Conn. 1925) ("Unless it unmistakably
appears that a congressional act was intended to be in disregard of a principle of interna-
tional comity, the presumption is that it was intended to be in conformity with it.")
121. E.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S 253, 314 (1829) (holding that courts must equate
treaties with congressional legislation), overruled in part by United States v. Percheman, 32
U.S. 51, 88 (1833) (reinterpreting a treaty as securing individual private property rights
prior to the cession of territory but not affecting the holding under Foster that treaties are
supreme law); Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Whether a treaty is
self-executing is an issue for judicial interpretation .... ); see also Covey T. Oliver, Trea-
ties, the Senate, and the Constitution: Some Current Questions, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 606, 609
(1957) (discussing the established role of the courts in determining whether a treaty is self-
executing).
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fact so communicated, they were not written as part of the treaty. Under
international procedures, the text of the treaty and any reservations to
the text constitute a "treaty."' 2 2 Under the Supremacy Clause, however,
only a "treaty" becomes the "Law of the Land.' 23 Thus, it is doubtful
that a court should consider a declaration part of what the Supremacy
Clause proclaims the supreme Law of the Land.
124
The determination of a treaty's composition has been litigated only
once. The matter arose in connection with a bilateral treaty between
Canada and the United States. 125 This treaty involved the production of
power, available through the use of the Niagara River, to facilities located
along the United States and Canadian border.1 26 In its resolution regard-
ing consent to the treaty, the United States Senate included a reservation
whereby the United States reserved the right to redevelop its portion of
the power generated only through an act of Congress. 27 The Power Au-
thority of the State of New York sought a license to use the Niagara River
for the state's anticipated power project.'28 The Federal Power Commis-
sion dismissed the Authority's license application, contending it was not
authorized to grant such a license given the Senate's reservation.' 29 The
court of appeals held that the statement was of no effect to Canada, be-
cause it addressed only rights to the U.S. portion of the river. 130 Because
the reservation affected only U.S. aspects of river usage, it was not a true
reservation and thus, was not a valid part of the treaty. 13 1 As a result, the
Commission did have the authority to issue licenses for the use of the
river, and the treaty was valid even without the Senate reservation's ap-
plicability to the Canadian government. 32
This precedent notwithstanding, the Restatement of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States maintains that a Senate reservation or
122. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 71, art. 2(1)(a) (defining
"treaty" as an agreement in either a single instrument or two or more related instruments);
id. art. 2(1)(d) (defining "reservation" as a statement made by a state purporting to modify
the effect of the treaty); id. arts. 19-23 (describing various aspects of reservations).
123. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
124. See id.
125. Power Auth. of New York v. Federal Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
(interpreting the Treaty Between the United States and Canada concerning uses of the
Waters of the Niagara River, Feb. 27, 1950, 1 U.S.T. 694).




130. Id. at 541.
131. Id. at 541-42.
132. Id.
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understanding of non-self-execution binds the courts.'3 3 Further, the Re-
statement provides that the Senate can withhold its consent entirely, or it
may consent on specified conditions. 3 The Restatement, however, pro-
vides little substantiation in the Senate's consent process, referring only
to the fact that presidents typically notify other states and the depository
agency of the declaration:
The President generally includes a verbatim recitation of any
proposed reservation, statement of understanding, or other dec-
laration relevant to the application or interpretation of the
treaty contained in the Senate resolution of consent, both in the
instrument notifying the other state or the depositary of United
States ratification or accession and in the proclamation of the
treaty.
135
The Restatement view might seem justified based on the rationale that a
greater power includes a lesser power. The Constitution, however, in giv-
ing the Senate the power of consent to treaties, did not contemplate any
power of imposing a condition. The Constitution granted the President
the power to negotiate treaties,136 and the Senate the power to give ad-
vice and to grant (or withhold) consent. 137 The import of this provision is
that the Senate may make suggestions to the President (the advice func-
tion) and then may say "yea" or "nay" to the treaty (the consent func-
tion). While a President who ignores the Senate's advice runs the risk
that the Senate may withhold consent, 138 the Constitution does not con-
template a power in the Senate to impose terms not contained in the
133. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 314 cmts. a & d (1987).
134. Id. at cmt. b. The Restatement explains that "[s]ince the President can make a
treaty only with the advice and consent of the Senate, he must give effect to conditions
imposed by the Senate on its consent." Id.
135. Id.
136. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that the President "shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur").
137. Id.
138. See 14 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 17, at 138
(1970).
The United States Senate, as part of the treaty-making power, may place a condi-
tion upon its approval of a treaty by including in its resolution of advice and
consent a reservation, understanding, or some other declaration or statement ....
If the President is not satisfied with a condition attached by the Senate, he may
return the treaty to the Senate with further explanation and for further considera-
tion or he may simply fail to execute a ratification, thus leaving the treaty un-
perfected so far as the United States is concerned.
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treaty as negotiated by the President. The Senate enjoys a veto power,
not a power of revision.
139
When the Senate appends a consent resolution with certain statements
regarding a treaty's application, but those statements are reflected
neither in the treaty text nor in a reservation, the statements have no
constitutional status, even if the President reports those statements to the
depository agency. The President's act of reporting such statements does
not turn such statements into law.
A Senate declaration is a statement accompanying ratification expres-
sing U.S. policy, but does not derogate obligations of the United States
under the treaty.14 ° Indeed, that is why the statement is denominated
"declaration" rather than "reservation. '
141
A statement made in a declaration may, under certain circumstances,
be considered a reservation, even though it is not so named. The gener-
ally accepted definition of "reservation" is "a unilateral statement, how-
ever phrased or named, made by a State, . . . whereby it purports to
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in
their application to that State.", 42 Under this definition, if a statement
labelled "declaration" exempts the state from complying with a treaty ob-
ligation, it is a reservation. Indeed, the Human Rights Committee fol-
139. See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
140. See WHITEMAN, supra note 138, § 17 at 138 (indicating that such statements "are
used most often when it is considered essential or desirable to give notice of certain mat-
ters of policy or principle, without an intention of derogating from the substantive rights or
obligations stipulated in the treaty"); see also Jordan J. Paust, Avoiding "Fraudulent" Exec-
utive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1257, 1267-68 (1993) (arguing that a non-self-executing declaration
makes no sense in the realm of human rights treaties since it would derogate from substan-
tive rights of the treaty).
141. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, Foreword: Symposium on Parlia-
mentary Participation in the Making and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 293,
296-97 (1991) (further defining "declaration"). These authors note:
We believe that the Senate lacks the constitutional authority to declare the non-
self-executing character of a treaty with binding effect on U.S. courts. The Senate
has the unicameral power only to consent to the ratification of treaties, not to
pass domestic legislation. A declaration is not part of a treaty in the sense of
modifying the legal obligations created by it. A declaration is merely an expres-
sion of an interpretation or of a policy or position. U.S. courts are bound by the
Constitution to apply treaties as the law of the land. They are not bound to apply
expressions of opinion adopted by the Senate (and concurred in by the Presi-
dent). The courts must undertake their own examination of the terms and con-
text of each provision in a treaty to which the United States is a party and decide
whether it is self-executing. The treaty is law. The Senate's declaration is not
law. The Senate does not have the power to make law outside the treaty
instrument.
Id.
142. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 71, art. 2(1)(d).
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lows this definition in determining which qualifying statements are
reservations.
1 43
Under this definition, the declarations regarding non-self-execution in
the Convention Against Torture and the International Covenant are not
reservations because they do not exempt the United States from comply-
ing with the obligation of domestic enforcement. Although the declara-
tions have the potential of being read as exempting the United States
from complying with the obligation of domestic enforcement, the more
logical reading, as indicated," is that they do not.
VII. RIGHTS PROVISIONS IN TREATIES AS SELF-EXECUTING
If the Senate declarations in the International Covenant and the Con-
vention Against Torture do not bind the courts, the courts must them-
selves decide whether the Covenant norms are norms of domestic law.
Since the two treaties became effective in the United States, no court has
ruled on whether any of their provisions constitute domestic law.1 45 The
starting point in analyzing whether the treaties are binding is the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that
treaties are the "Law of the Land" and that "the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby.,
146
The Supremacy Clause refers only to state court judges, given that the
purpose of the clause was to ensure federal supremacy over the states in
this matter.147 However, the Supreme Court held that federal courts also
143. General Comment, supra note 40, at 841.
144. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing Senate committee letter on
meaning of "non-self-executing").
145. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 818-19 & n.26 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (stating that the rights provisions of the International Cove-
nant do not create a cause of action for individuals in the courts of state parties), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); cf United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 799 (S.D. Fla.
1992) (stating that individuals typically cannot assert individual rights under a treaty); Hai-
tian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1110 (11th Cir. 1991); Dreyfus v. Von
Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976). For two cases decided after U.S. ratification of the Inter-
national Covenant in which U.S. courts of appeal responded on the merits to a party's
invocation of the Covenant without questioning its applicability as domestic law, see Free-
dom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.2d 1431, 1442 (9th Cir. 1996) (declining to
apply the International Covenant's provisions on freedom of movement within a state, and
freedom to leave a state, on grounds that they were factually inapplicable to plaintiff's
claim of a right to travel to a different state); White v. Johnson, 79 F.2d 432, 440 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1996) (declining to apply the International Covenant's article on torture or cruel treat-
ment on grounds that a U.S. reservation to that article limited its meaning to what the
United States understands to be "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
146. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
147. Id.
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are bound by the Supremacy Clause based on the "Law of the Land"
language.148 The Court stated that any treaty provision capable of judi-
cial enforcement should be applied by the courts, and one aspect of ap-
plying such provision is permitting a private litigant to rely upon the
treaty as the basis for a cause of action.
149
U.S. courts routinely hold rights provisions in treaties to be self-execut-
ing. A treaty requiring that foreigners arrested in the United States be
advised of their right to contact their country's consul, for example, has
been read to give a right that the arrestee can assert in court. 150 Another
example is a provision common in extradition treaties stating that extra-
dition is available only for certain offenses, and that once a person is ex-
tradited on a given offense, he may not be tried for additional offenses.
Courts deem such a provision as affording a right the extraditee can
assert.
151
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has provided the most elab-
orate self-execution analysis of treaty provisions in federal case law, iden-
tifying four factors for a court to consider: "the purposes of the treaty
and the objectives of its creators, the existence of domestic procedures
and institutions appropriate for direct implementation, the availability
and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods, and the immediate
and long-range social consequences of self- or non-self-execution."' 152
A court applying this four-prong test to the rights provisions of the
Convention Against Torture or the International Covenant would con-
clude that these provisions are self-executing. First, the obvious purpose
of a treaty provision granting a particular human right is that the con-
tracting parties afford all persons that right. Second, certain domestic
procedures and institutions are appropriate for direct implementation-
namely the courts. Third, methods of enforcement other than domestic
courts are weak. Fourth, the immediate and long-range social conse-
148. Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S 253, 314 (1829) ("Our constitution declares a treaty to be
the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to
an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative
provision."), overruled in part by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 531 n.6 (9th Cir. 1979)
(finding that a foreigner's private cause of action arose out of a regulation based on a
treaty), rev'd sub. nom. U.S. v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529, 530 (9th Cir. 1980).
150. See id. (acknowledging a cause of action based on the purported violation of a
regulation promulgated in compliance with a treaty).
151. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 427-29 (1886) (citing Commonwealth v.
Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, 702-03 (1878) holding that a person extradited to the United
States could not be tried for an offense other than that for which he was extradited).
152. Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
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quences of non-self-execution are serious because individuals may be
subjected to onerous deprivations of rights.
Thus, if a federal court is faced with an extradition request, and the
extraditee asserts that rights protected under either the Convention
Against Torture or the International Covenant would be violated by the
requesting state, the court should deem as domestic law both the relevant
right and the provision of each of the two treaties that precludes
extradition.
153
VIII. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN THE RULE
OF NON-INQUIRY
In practice, the Secretary of State's inquiry role has had little impact on
extradition. Although several times the Secretary of State has required
Italy to re-try a person convicted in absentia,'54 the Secretary has rarely
refused to surrender a person found extraditable by a magistrate. 55 Be-
cause secretaries of state inevitably consider the request in the context of
U.S. relations with the requesting state, a refusal to extradite because of
anticipated ill-treatment may complicate relations with the requesting
state.156 In addition, because of this political element, little consistency
can be expected from one case to the next, or from one administration to
the next.
Inquiry issues associated with extradition can be handled better by a
court than by the executive branch because the required inquiry involves
factual issues with legal elements. In Ng,'57 for example, the issue was
whether execution in a particular gas chamber constituted torture or in-
human treatment. 158 Greater regularity can be achieved if courts make
such determinations.
Originally, extradition was entirely an affair of the executive branch.
Officials in the executive branch responded to an extradition request by
153. Cf. Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of Non-
Inquiry in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1198, 1224-25 (1991)
(arguing that the International Covenant is not self-executing, and therefore, it does pro-
vide a proper basis for abandoning the rule of non-inquiry).
154. Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 78 (2d Cir. 1960) (referring to Italian cases in which
the U.S. Secretary of State demanded a retrial of persons convicted in absentia).
155. Semmelman, supra note 153, at 1233 n.240; John G. Kester, Some Myths of United
States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1485-86 (1988).
156. See Semmelman, supra note 153, at 1199 n.3 (citing testimony and authors who
hold this view).
157. See Ng. v. Canada, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Communication No. 469/1991, Dec. of
Nov. 5, 1993, reprinted in 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 149 (1994).
158. Id.
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applying existing extradition treaties. 159 Out of concern that the political
branch might be less than objective, 6 ' the United States and United
Kingdom took the lead in the nineteenth century in the use of judicial
hearings. 61 Today, a judicial hearing is the universal practice. 62 The
reason for this development is the same that calls for judges to exercise
the power of inquiry: to provide fair treatment for the extraditee. 63
Exercising the power of inquiry, a Secretary of State occupies the same
awkward position that the Department of State held until 1976 on the
issue of sovereign immunity. Until 1976, when a foreign state sought to
be excused as a defendant in a U.S. court, the State Department gave the
court its opinion as to whether immunity was appropriate; the courts re-
quired the Department's advice.1 64 This approach proved unsatisfactory,
however, because the State Department was unable to follow a consistent
course in considering these requests. In particular, the Department
found it difficult to disregard the identity of the state making the request
and the United States' relationship with that state. 65
In 1976, Congress determined the State Department should no longer
address sovereign immunity matters, rather, the courts should address
them. 166 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 set standards for
the courts to apply in determining when foreign states are entitled to im-
159. BASSIOUNI, supra note 27, at 505.
160. See 1 JOHN B. MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDI-
TION 90 (1891) (noting an example of American and British politicians using extradition in
effecting policy decisions).
161. A Treaty to settle and define boundaries between the United states and the posses-
sions of Her Britannic Majesty in North America; for the final suppression of the African
slave trade; and for the giving up of criminals, fugitive from justice, in certain cases, Aug. 9,
1842, U.S.-Britain, 8 Stat. 572. See In re Metzger, 17 F. Cas. 232, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1847)
(noting a treaty between the United States and England that favored the use of the judici-
ary in extradition cases), habeas corpus denied, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 176, 182 (1847) (noting
the court's lack of jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus relief to an extraditee).
162. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 27, at 505.
163. 2 LORD McNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS 44 (1956) (providing the opin-
ion of the Law Officers of the Crown, Oct. 4, 1815).
164. Jack B. Tate, Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to
Foreign Governments, 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952) (letter to Attorney General from
State Department).
165. See Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
in Perspective: A Founder's View, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 302, 304 (1986) (stating that
"strong pressures were brought to bear on the government to allow immunity for foreign
policy reasons").
166. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 4(a), 90 Stat.
2892 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1994)) (stating the findings and purpose of
the act).
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munity from suit.167 As a result of the Act's implementation, the issue of
foreign sovereign immunity has been largely de-politicized, and the gov-
ernment's practice has become more uniform.
168
The same considerations apply to the rule of non-inquiry. Congress
could instruct the courts to make the inquiry. 169 Since the rule of non-
inquiry is not based on the Constitution, 7 ° Congress could change it. An
end to the rule of non-inquiry also would relieve the Secretary of State of
the awkward role of balancing the interests of justice in the particular
case against the interest of the United States in its relations with the re-
questing state.
Even in the absence of congressional action, the courts could abandon
the rule of non-inquiry. It has been suggested that the federal statutes
require the rule's application to extradition because courts have been si-
lent on the subject.17' The case law, however, does not base the rule on
the federal statutes, 172 and judicial silence is hardly a firm basis. The rule
of non-inquiry is a rule of judicial origin, and the federal courts could
abandon it on policy grounds, even if the courts are not persuaded that
the human rights treaties require them to do so.
167. Id. (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994)) (stating the exception to juris-
dictional immunity).
168. See David A. Brittenham, Note, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Commercial Ac-
tivity: A Conflicts Approach, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1440, 1443 (1983) (stating that the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act "has been largely successful in affording private parties the
opportunity to have claims arising out of the commercial activities of foreign states adjudi-
cated in federal courts, without engendering serious diplomatic repercussions").
169. The House Judiciary Committee proposed a bill requiring the courts to conduct an
inquiry into the level of fairness to be received by the extraditee in the requesting country.
H.R. 3347, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3194(d)(2)(D)(ii) (1984) (stating that the court should
deny extradition if the person "would, as a result of extradition, be subjected to fundamen-
tal unfairness"). The proposal's extradition reform was not enacted.
170. See In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1330 n.6 (1st Cir. 1993). The court
explained:
The government suggests that the Constitution mandates the rule of non-inquiry.
We disagree .... Rather, the rule came into being as judges, attempting to inter-
pret particular treaties, concluded that, absent a contrary indication in a specific
instance, the ratification of an extradition treaty mandated non-inquiry as a mat-
ter of international comity.
Id.
171. Cf. Semmelman, supra note 153, at 1210.
172. See Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1067 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding the rule of non-
inquiry based on inter. -tional comity with the requesting state and making no mention of
any acts of Congress); cf. Semmelman, supra note 153, at 1212-13 (citing Neely v. Henkel,
180 U.S. 109 (1901), as representing a Supreme Court conclusion that the rule of non-
inquiry is based on statutes). In Neely, however, the statutes in question related only to the
special case of extradition to a territory under U.S. occupation, in which case extradition
was based entirely on statute rather than on an extradition treaty. Id.
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IX. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE RULE OF NON-INQUIRY
A number of policy considerations have been raised favoring the in-
quiry function to remain with the Secretary of State. It has been argued,
for example, that the Secretary is better able than a court to ensure fair
treatment for an extraditee because the Secretary can discuss the matter
with the authorities of the requesting state, and, if necessary, demand as a
condition of surrender that the requesting state act in a particular fashion
towards the extraditee. 7 3 While it may be true in principle that the Sec-
retary of State is better positioned to negotiate,' 74 it is also true that the
Secretary may be under pressure to ignore the risk of mistreatment for
fear of jeopardizing relations with the requesting state. Moreover, it is
not true that the courts are unable to gain assurances from the requesting
state.
In Ahmad v. Wigen,1 75 when the habeas judge considered evidence re-
garding the risk of torture for the extraditee in Israel, the government of
Israel made representations on the record to the court that it would treat
the man fairly. 176 The kind of assurance the Israeli government provided
is more explicit and more public than any assurance that a Secretary of
State is likely to exact from a requesting state.
In addition, it is argued in support of the rule of non-inquiry that a
court-conducted inquiry is, by its nature, more public than a Secretary of
State's representations and runs the risk of jeopardizing United States
relations with the requesting state and damaging other foreign relations
objectives.1 77 This argument may have made sense in the by-gone era
when human rights were barely an issue in state-to-state relations, but, at
this late date, the argument is obsolete. States routinely consider human
rights in their relations with other states. 178 Moreover, the risk of jeop-
173. Semmelman, supra note 153, at 1229.
174. See supra note 154-56 and accompanying text (discussing the policy consideration
that Secretaries of State consider relations with the requesting State when determining
whether an individual should be extradited).
175. 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
176. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 422 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). Here, Dorit Beinish,
State Attorney, Ministry of Justice of Israel, stated in part, "[W]e offer our assurance that if
Atta [the extraditee] is extradited to Israel, his interrogation will not employ torture, physi-
cal or psychological, or inhumane treatment or improper means .... " Id.
177. Semmelman, supra note 153, at 1230-31.
178. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1994) (banning security assistance to countries violating
internationally recognized human rights); id. § 2151(n) (1994) (prohibiting any assistance
whatsoever to states whose governments "engage[d] in a consistent pattern of gross viola-
tions of internationally recognized human rights"); see also DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAcrICES FOR 1983, 1-3 (1984) (submitted to the
Joint Comm. on Foreign Affairs, at Congress's request to document rights violations in
states receiving U.S. aid).
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ardizing foreign relations is probably less if a court, rather than the Secre-
tary of State, makes the determination to refuse to surrender, because the
judiciary is a less political branch. 7 9
It also is argued in support of the rule of non-inquiry that refusing ex-
tradition on grounds of a potential violation of the extraditee's rights may
constitute a violation of the applicable extradition treaty, since the treaty
probably will not include an exception for situations in which the request-
ing state may violate rights.1 s0 However, if the United States bears a
treaty obligation to refuse to surrender an extraditee when rights viola-
tions are anticipated, then it would violate that treaty obligation by effect-
ing the surrender. Thus, the United states would violate a treaty
regardless of its decision.
Such a conflict of treaty obligations is not in fact present. An extradi-
tion treaty silent on the issue of the requesting state's potential violation
of an extraditee's rights would not necessarily be in conflict with an ex-
plicit human rights obligation assumed in another treaty. In most in-
stances, the states that are party to the bilateral extradition treaty would
also be parties to the Convention Against Torture or the International
Covenant since both enjoy widespread adherence.18' If the bilateral ex-
tradition treaty is silent on the issue, but the human rights treaty ad-
dresses it, then the intent of the parties is that no surrender be made in
such a situation.
Finally, the argument that an inquiry might violate the extradition
treaty is not in fact an argument for the rule of non-inquiry, but an argu-
ment against even the Secretary of State's surrender. If the Secretary of
State blocks a surrender, the requesting state might consider that act a
violation of the extradition treaty, just as if a court blocked the surrender.
Given that neither the Constitution nor a statute requires the applica-
tion of the rule of non-inquiry, the policy issue is the controlling factor for
a federal court not inclined to address the issue on the basis of the human
rights treaties. When a court addresses the rule on the basis of the trea-
ties, the policy factors are nonetheless relevant, and they clearly bolster a
rejection of the rule and the conduct of an inquiry. The policy arguments
raised in support of the rule are insubstantial and those raised against the
rule are persuasive.
179. Kester, supra note 155, at 1481-82.
180. Semmelman, supra note 153, at 1231.
181. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 29 (showing 86 states as parties to the Con-
vention Against Torture); id. at 117-18 (showing 129 states as parties to the International
Covenant).
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X. UNITED STATES PRECEDENT FOR IGNORING THE RULE
OF NON-INQUIRY
Many federal magistrates and judges presented with situations involv-
ing the potential for severe rights violations of an extraditee have indi-
cated unease concerning the rule of non-inquiry. 182 An extradition
practitioner sums up the case law as follows: "If courts feel sufficiently
uncomfortable about the fairness of the fate awaiting the accused, they
may be more lenient in granting him scope to put on a defense here, or
may become exceptionally demanding of technical perfection in the ex-
tradition request." '183
In a Second Circuit case, in which the extraditee claimed he would be
subject to unfair procedures in the requesting state, the court provided a
broad statement suggesting that a court should entertain evidence of po-
tential ill-treatment.' 84 While refusing to entertain the evidence the man
offered, the court stated in dictum that it would reexamine extradition in
cases where it found the potential ill-treatment so egregious as to be "an-
tipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency.'
1 85
The notion that in extreme cases inquiry should be undertaken appears
in other appellate decisions as well. A man the Israeli government sought
on war crimes charges alleged that Israel would violate his procedural
rights in a variety of ways.' 86 The Sixth Circuit stressed that it would not
inquire into potential irregularities in the Israeli proceedings "[i]n the ab-
sence of any showing that Demjanjuk [the extraditee] will be subjected to
procedures 'antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency."'187
When Germany sought the surrender of a man for a murder committed
nineteen years earlier, the extraditee argued that the passage of so much
time diminished the likelihood that he could be tried fairly.' 8 In reply,
the Seventh Circuit held that extradition would be ordered so long as
there was no violation of "constitutionally impermissible factors as race,
color, sex, national origin, religion, or political beliefs, and in accordance
with such other exceptional constitutional limitations as may exist be-
cause of particularly atrocious procedures or punishments employed by
182. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1197 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting the application of
due process principles to extradition cases); Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960)
(expressing concern regarding the application of the non-inquiry rule), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 851 (1960).
183. Kester, supra note 155, at 1446-47.
184. Gallina, 278 F.2d at 79.
185. Id.
186. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016
(1986).
187. Id. at 583 (quoting Gallina, 278 F.2d at 79).
188. In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1486-87 (7th Cir. 1984).
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the foreign jurisdiction."' 8 9 The court found the instant situation insuffi-
cient to meet this standard. 190 The court, nonetheless, demonstrated in
dicta that it would not extradite if serious violations of rights were
anticipated. 191
Sought on theft charges by the United Kingdom, a Chassidic Jew
claimed that he would starve to death in a British prison because the
prison could not satisfy his dietary needs and because he would not eat
non-conforming food. 9 2 The Fourth Circuit explained that such a predic-
ament would be self-induced and concluded that the British prison could
likely serve him food meeting his requirements. 193 In dicta, however, the
Fourth Circuit stated:
Seldom, however, can a principle of law [the rule of non-in-
quiry] be carried to absolute extremes without developing fis-
sures. It is unlikely that extradition would be ordered if the
facts were established ... that the prisons of a foreign country
regularly opened each day's proceedings with a hundred lashes
applied to the back of each prisoner who did not deny his or her
God or conducted routine breakings on the wheel for every
prisoner.
194
In another example, a woman requested for narcotics importation ar-
gued that she would be held in solitary confinement during interrogation
in Iceland and objected to her surrender on that basis.' 95 In light of Ice-
land's outstanding human rights record, the Ninth Circuit refused to con-
sider the woman's prediction concerning the treatment awaiting her
because it was "uncorroborated."' 96 Hypothetically, adhering to the
court's rationale, if the woman had presented stronger evidence, the
court would have considered it.
A man, sought by the Italian government, called the criminal justice
system of Italy into question, much as the extraditee had tried to do with
the Cuban criminal justice system in Neely v. Henkel.197 The extraditee
argued that Italy's criminal procedure "violates all American notions of
due process, decency and human rights," claiming that there was no right
189. Id. at 1487.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1484 (citing Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 348-49 (4th Cir. 1983)).
192. Prushinowski v. Samples, 734 F.2d 1016, 1018 (4th Cir. 1984).
193. Id. at 1019, 1019 n.1.
194. Id. at 1019.
195. Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1983).
196. See id. (rejecting inquiry because the evidence the petitioner presented was too
attenuated).
197. Esposito v. Adams, 700 F. Supp. 1470 (N.D. I11. 988) (citing Neely v. Henkel, 180
U.S. 109 (1901)).
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to confront witnesses and that proceedings were excessively delayed.19
The district court cited contrary evidence that Italy permitted cross-exam-
ination of witnesses and opined that procedures in Italy were generally
fair.199 The court ordered extradition, but only after concluding that Ital-
ian procedures "were far from lacking 'even the barest rudiments of a
process calculated to arrive at the truth of the accusations.'
2
11
Judicial misgivings about non-inquiry also have appeared in cases in
which a foreign state requested the extradition of a person that state had
already convicted in absentia.2 °1 The foreign state typically cited the in
absentia conviction to show probable cause that the person had commit-
ted the offense.20 2 The federal courts have nonetheless demanded proof,
out of concern that if the person were surrendered, he might be incarcer-
ated on the basis of conviction at a trial at which he had no opportunity to
present a defense. 0 3 In some instances, to satisfy the magistrate's con-
cern that the extraditee would be imprisoned in Italy on the basis of an
earlier in absentia conviction, the government of Italy agreed to give the
extraditee a new trial.204
In another representative case, Canada convicted two men for import-
ing hashish.205 At their trial in Canada, the judge dismissed the charge
because of a variance between the indictment and the offered proof.
20 6
However, as a result of the prosecution's appeal, the appellate court, in a
proceeding at which the two men were not present, reversed the trial
court and entered a judgment of conviction.20 7 In the United States, the
pair objected to their extradition on the grounds that they had been con-
victed in absentia since they had not been present at the Canadian appel-
late proceedings.208 The Second Circuit replied that they had not been
198. Id. at 1480.
199. Id. at 1481.
200. Id. (quoting Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1197, 1197-98 (2d Cir. 1980)).
201. United States ex. rel Argento v. Jacobs, 176 F. Supp. 877, 879 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
202. Id. at 883.
203. Ex parte Fudera, 162 F. 591, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1908), appeal dismissed sub nom. Ital-
ian Government v. Asaro, 219 U.S. 589 (1911); Jacobs, 176 F. Supp. at 879; see also
MOORE, supra note 160, at 133; 4 GREEN H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 317, 132 (1942). The Secretary of State, in response to an extradition request by
Greece, indicated that proof of probable cause would be demanded prior to extradition).
Id.
204. In re Extradition of D'Amico, 177 F. Supp. 648, 651 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Charles
C. Hyde, A Report of a Recent Extradition Case: Re Macaluso, 7 I11. L. Rev. 237, 238 (1912)
(unreported case) (written by counsel for the Italian government in the case).
205. United States ex rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925, 926 (2d Cir. 1974).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 928.
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tried in absentia, because they had been present at their trial.2°9 The Sec-
ond Circuit noted, however, in dicta that "[i]nability to assert a defense"
might be "so antipathetic" to the court's "sense of decency" as to bar
extradition.2 1 ' Nevertheless, courts have inquired as to the sufficiency of
criminal processes in foreign countries.2"'
For instance, in Ahmad v. Wigen,212 the district court entertained ex-
tensive evidence regarding potential torture, on the theory that such evi-
dence might suffice to upset the court's sense of decency. 13 The Israeli
government sought the extraditee, a Palestinian, on terrorism-related
charges including murder,214 and the extraditee claimed he would be tor-
tured during interrogation. 1 5 The district court judge considered oral
and documentary evidence that Israel's security police routinely used
physical force in interrogating Palestinians detained on such charges.
216
The district judge said that a magistrate should "determine the nature of
treatment probably awaiting petitioner in a requesting nation to deter-
mine whether he or she can demonstrate probable exposure to such treat-
ment as would violate universally accepted principles of human rights.,
217
Entitling such an approach a "Due Process Exception to the Rule of
Non-Inquiry,"2 ' the judge explained, "We cannot blind ourselves to the
foreseeable and probable results of the exercise of our jurisdiction.,
219
More importantly, the district court judge considered the international
rule requiring inquiry. In doing so, he relied upon the decision of the
European Court of Human Rights that ordered the United Kingdom to
deny extradition to the United States for a capital trial in Virginia, be-
cause of the anticipated impact on the extraditee of the length and condi-
tions of incarceration on Virginia's death row.2 20 The judge found the
international standard sufficient to justify ignoring the rule of non-in-
quiry, where a serious violation of rights awaits the extraditee.22'
209. Id. at 928-29.
210. Id. at 928.
211. See infra notes 216-31 and accompanying text (citing examples where federal
courts evaluate criminal procedures of other countries).
212. 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir.), stay denied, 497
U.S. 1054 (1990).
213. Id. at 416.
214. Id. at 394. The charges included murder, attempted murder, causing harm with
aggravated intent, attempted arson, and conspiracy to commit a felony. Id.
215. Id. at 409, 416.
216. Id. at 416.
217. Id. at 410.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 413 (referring to Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989)).
221. Id. at 413-14.
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Even after the court of appeals decision in Ahmad v. Wigen, a district
court in the same federal circuit, in Gill v. Imundi, read the international
rule of inquiry narrowly as prohibiting inquiry only by a habeas judge, but
not necessarily by an extradition magistrate.222 This district court noted
in the petitioner's argument that Ahmad precludes inquiry by a habeas
judge but not by an examining magistrate, and stated, "Ahmad does, nev-
ertheless, rather clearly foreclose, if not an extradition judge's than [sic] a
federal habeas court's inquiry into such conditions . "..."223
To explain why a federal court of appeals' effort to preclude inquiry by
an examining magistrate would be futile, the district court noted that the
United States Attorney has no right to appeal from a denial of ex-
traditability by a magistrate.224 The court of appeals in Ahmad focused
strongly on the scope of review via habeas corpus, 225 but also referred to
the Secretary of State's role in making the inquiry as an exclusive role.226
The Gill court's point, however, is telling. The higher federal courts
have no way of keeping an examining magistrate from inquiring because
an examining magistrate has the unreviewable power to make a finding of
non-extraditability.227 Thus, the most the courts can do is prevent inquiry
by a habeas judge, because a finding by a habeas judge is appealable.228
The federal court's displeasure with the rule of non-inquiry accords
with the international practice rejecting the rule. Taking an approach
consistent with international practice, however, would not be a complete
innovation in federal law. In 1985, the United States amended its extradi-
tion treaty with the United Kingdom by adding a provision requiring a
magistrate to deny extradition if the extraditee shows:
[B]y a preponderance of the evidence that the request for extra-
dition has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him on
account of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions, or
that he would, if surrendered, be prejudiced at his trial or pun-
ished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of
his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions.229
222. Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp 1028, 1049-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
223. Id. at 1050.
224. Id. at 1050 n.23. "A ruling that such considerations are beyond the competence of
the extradition judge would be unenforceable since a determination by an extradition mag-
istrate to withhold certification under 18 U.S.C. § 3184, on whatever ground, is unappeala-
ble." Id.
225. Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1066 (2d Cir.), stay denied, 497 U.S. 1054 (1990).
226. Id. at 1067.
227. Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1050 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
228. See supra text accompanying note 10 (explaining American court procedure and
appealability of federal district court's judgement on writ of habeas corpus).
229. Supplementary Treaty of June 25, 1985, text in 132 CONG. REC. 16,558 (1986) (re-
citing art. 3(a) of the Supplementary Extradition Treaty signed on June 25, 1985 by the
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This provision barred extradition where the request, though based on
probable cause of an extraditable offense, is motivated by an aim of per-
secuting the extraditee.23° It requires the court's inquiry to determine
whether the person being extradited faces discriminatory treatment.
Members of the Senate proposed the provision due to a concern over
special procedures the United Kingdom used to try Irish revolutionaries
in Northern Ireland.23' While the scope of the required inquiry is not
clear,232 this provision mandates that a magistrate examine the general
fairness of the judicial procedures that will be used to try the person be-
ing extradited. 233 Aware of the rule of non-inquiry, the Senate, through
the amendment, demonstrated its intent not to follow the rule.234 Creat-
ing this rule allowed the courts to follow a standard, likely in a consistent
fashion, and further prevented leaving the matter to the discretion of the
Secretary of State.
The fact that the Senate called for judicial inquiry in the above extradi-
tion treaty demonstrates that it did not find significant policy factors
against such an approach. The resulting provision reinforces the views of
many courts that have concluded that if significant rights violations can
be expected, an American court should not facilitate illegality by surren-
dering a person under an extradition treaty.
United States and the United Kingdom). On July 16, 1986, the Senate approved the ratifi-
cation of this treaty. Id. at 16,611; see also Kelly D. Talcott, Note, Questions of Justice:
U.S. Courts' Powers of Inquiry under Article 3(a) of the United States-United Kingdom
Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 474, 477 (1987) (noting that
the amended version of the treaty allows American courts to evaluate the judicial system
of Northern Ireland before permitting extradition).
230. John P. Groarke, Comment, Revolutionaries Beware: The Erosion of the Political
Offense Exception Under the 1986 United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradi-
tion Treaty, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1515, 1530 (1988).
231. 132 CONG. REC. 16,607-10 (1986) (analyzing the trial procedures in Northern Ire-
land as applied to Irish revolutionaries); see also Michael P. Scharf, Note, Foreign Courts
on Trial: Why U.S. Courts Should Avoid Applying the Inquiry Provision of the Supplemen-
tary U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 257, 264 (1988) (noting concern of
critics over an original version of the treaty that "almost completely eliminates the political
offense exception").
232. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The "Political Offense Exception" Revisited: Extradition Be-
tween the U.S. and the U.K.-A Choice Between Friendly Cooperation Among Allies and
Sound Law and Policy, 15 DENV. J. INr'L L. & POL'Y 255, 277 (1987); see also Scharf,
supra note 231, at 277; In re Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 716-19 (9th Cir. 1995)
(observing the difficulty that the district court encountered regarding the scope of inquiry
because the matter was of first impression).
233. Talcott, supra note 229, at 476-77; Scharf, supra note 231, at 266.
234. See Groarke, supra note 230, at 1530 (explaining that amendment alters the tradi-
tional rule of non-inquiry); In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1330 (1st Cir. 1993)
("The Supplementary Treaty openly alters this traditional practice [the rule of non-
inquiry].")
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XI. CONCLUSION
The emergence in the mid-twentieth century of human rights law re-
flects a maturing of international law from the nineteenth century para-
digm of a legal order operating only on the state-to-state plane. The
federal rule of non-inquiry was consistent with international practice at
the time it was developed. Today, however, it is at odds with interna-
tional practice and as such has been repudiated by the international com-
munity. Specifically, it has been repudiated in two human rights treaties,
to both of which the United States is a party. The federal courts are
bound by these developments to conduct an inquiry if an extraditee faces
persecution in the requesting state. The federal courts should give heed
to these developments and reject the rule of non-inquiry.
